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THE POLICY UNDERLYING CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY: PRACTICAL REFLECTIONS
ON A THEORETICAL DEBATE
ABSTRACT. This article argues that the debate concerning the theoretical char-
acterization of the policy requirement as either an element of crime or an evidentiary
relevant circumstance for crimes against humanity is deﬁcient. Comparative case law
analysis illustrates that this characterization does not fundamentally aﬀect the po-
sition, meaning and scope of the policy underlying crimes against humanity in
judicial practice. This can be explained by the ‘‘open texture’’ of legal rules and the
factor-based character of judicial decision-making. This article aims to initiate a
practical debate that evaluates the added value of a policy element on the basis of its
application in individual cases.
I INTRODUCTION
Crimes against humanity are an elusive and uncertain category of
international crimes.Despite the signiﬁcant clariﬁcationof themeaning
and scope of this international crime in the jurisprudence of the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), fun-
damental questions remain. One of the issues of continuous debate, in
both academia and judicial practice, is the necessity of the incorpora-
tion of a policy requirement in the chapeau of crimes against humanity
and the desired form and scope of such a requirement. The debate
demonstrates a particular disagreement amongst scholars on the
characterization of the policy requirement in the crimes against
humanity concept. Whereas one group of scholars qualiﬁes the policy
requirement as a necessary element of crimes against humanity that
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ought to be established before an actmay be qualiﬁed as a crime against
humanity, other questionboth thenecessityof and the legal basis for the
incorporation of a policy requirement in the chapeau of crimes against
humanity.Rather, they consider the existence of a policy underlying the
crimes as a relevant factual circumstance that may be used as evidence
for establishing the chapeau elements of crimes against humanity, in
particular the widespread of systematic attack-requirement.
These opposing views on the character of the policy requirement
in the crimes against humanity concept are similarly reﬂected in the
jurisprudence of the ICTY and the International Criminal Court
(ICC). On the one hand, the ICTY has held that the existence of a
policy underlying the crimes committed is not an autonomous ele-
ment of crimes against humanity, but may be evidentially relevant in
evaluating the systematic character of the attack against the civilian
population. On the other hand, the Rome Statute of the ICC in
Article 7(2) explicitly incorporates a state or organizational policy as
an autonomous element of the crime.
Analysis of the case law of both these institutions, however, shows
that the theoretical characterization of the policy requirement does
not exclusively determine its practical application. Despite the con-
trary theoretical understanding of the character of the policy re-
quirement by the ICTY and the ICC, their factual substantiation of
the existence of a policy is comparable. Furthermore, the ﬁnding of
the existence of a policy appears to have no greater relevance when it is
observed as an element of crime in the context of the ICC than as an
evidential circumstance in the ICTY’s jurisprudence. The ICTY and
ICC use and apply the policy in a similar manner.
The similar construction of the policy requirement by the ICTY and
ICCdetracts from thepractical valueof the current academicdebate. In
light of recent practice, the distinction between the recognition of the
policy as a legal element or as a ‘‘mere’’ relevant factual circumstance,
becomes anacademic one.This article argues that discussions about the
added value of the policy element may not be limited to academic
distinctions concerning the abstract characterization of the law, but
must always take account of how the law is applied in individual cases.
The article accordingly aims to induce a more practical debate where
the added value of the policy element to the crimes against humanity
concept is observed on the basis of its application in individual cases.
The ﬁrst part of the article (section II) describes the current state of
the academicdebate concerning the policy requirement.The term policy
requirement’ has become a term of art in academic literature on crimes
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against humanity. The use of the term requirement’ in this context is,
however, misleading. It implies that the existence of a policy is a neces-
sary condition for crimes against humanity whereas this, in fact, is still
the object of debate. The author hereinafter therefore generally reserves
the terms policy requirement’ and policy element’ for the situations
in which the existence of a policy is considered as a necessary and
autonomous element of crime. In the situations in which the policy is
observed as a ‘‘mere’’ relevant factual circumstance it is described by the
terms relevant circumstance’ or factor’. Having said that, in this ﬁrst
part of the article the terminology used in the academic debate is
adopted. In the second part of the article (sections III and IV), the case
lawof the ICTYand the ICC is discussed.Emphasis is thereby placedon
the factual circumstances that are used when applying the policy factor/
requirement in individual cases. Furthermore, a comparison is made
between the practical applicationof the policy factor/requirement by the
ICTY and ICC. In section V, the practical application of the policy is
contrasted with its theoretical characterization. This section illustrates
that the inclusion of the policy as an element of crime does not neces-
sarily generate a diﬀerent crimes against humanity concept than the
recognition of the policy as a relevant factual circumstance. In the ﬁnal
part of the article (section VI), the divergence between the theoretical
characterization and the practical application of the policy will be ex-
plained on the basis of the factor-based character of legal reasoning in
(international criminal) law.
II A FUNDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENT
International scholars generally agree that isolated, individual and
randomly committed acts of violence should be excluded from the
scope of crimes against humanity.1 A wave of spontaneous, unrelated
1 M. McAuliﬀe deGuzman, The Road from Rome: The Developing Law of
Crimes Against Humanity’ (2000) 22 Human Rights Quarterly 335, 375–376;
G. Mettraux, Crimes Against Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the International
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda’ (2002) 43 Harvard
International Law Journal 237, 314–315; K. Ambos & S. Wirth, The Current Law of
Crimes against Humanity’ (2002) 13 Criminal Law Forum 1, 30; R. Dixon (revised by
C. Hall), Article 7 Crimes Against Humanity’, in O. Triﬀterer (ed.), Commentary on
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Observers’ Notes, Article by
Article (Baden–Baden: C.H.Beck/Hart/Nomos, 2nd ed., 2008) 168, 169; W. A.
Schabas, State Policy as an Element of International Crimes’ (2008) 98 Journal of
Criminal Law & Criminology 953, 954; G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal
Law (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2nd ed., 2009) 288.
THE POLICY UNDERLYING CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 277
and randomly committed crimes that are the product of mere indi-
vidual action cannot qualify as crimes against humanity. Rather,
crimes against humanity are criminal acts that are part of a larger
context of organized violence. This limitation of the crimes against
humanity concept is essential in distinguishing international crimes
from ‘‘ordinary’’ domestic criminality.2
Under the Nuremberg Charter, these thoughts were reﬂected in
and ascertained by the war nexus’.3 This requirement restricted the
jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Tribunal to crimes against humanity
committed before or during the war’ and in execution or in con-
nection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal’, i.e.
crimes against peace or war crimes.4
In the years following World War II, the validity of the war nexus
was, however, increasingly questioned. In 1984, one of the delegates
to the International Law Commission (ILC) in this respect held that
while belligerency and criminality were closely linked in the World
War II period, in the modern age the concept of an international
crime has acquired a greater degree of autonomy and covers all of-
fences which seriously disturb the international public order’.5 The
delegates agreed that the concept of crimes against humanity had
become eﬀectively autonomous and was no longer linked with war
crimes or crimes against peace.6
2 P. Hwang, Deﬁning Crimes Against Humanity in the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court’ (1998) 22 Fordham International Law Journal 457, 489;
B. Van Schaack, The Deﬁnition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the
Incoherence’ (1999) 37 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 787, 787.
3 Van Schaack (n. 2 above) 850; Ambos & Wirth (n. 1 above) 5.
4 In this respect Robert Jackson considered that [i]t has been a general principle of
foreign policy of our Government from time immemorial that the internal aﬀairs of
another government are not ordinarily our business…The reason that this program
of extermination of the Jews and destruction of the rights of minorities becomes an
international concern is this: it was part of a plan for making an illegal war. Unless
we have a war connection as a basis for reaching them, I would think we have no
basis for dealing with atrocities. They were a part of the preparation for war or for
the conduct of the war in so far as they occurred inside of Germany and that makes
them our concern’. Minutes of Conference Session of July 23, 1945. Quoted in Van
Schaack (n. 2 above) 799.
5 D. Thiam, Special Rapporteur, Second Report on the Draft Code of Oﬀences
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind [1984], 2 Y. B. Int’l Comm’n, UN Doc
A/CN.4/SerA/1984, 90.
6 Summary Records of the 1960s Meeting, [1986] 1 Y. B. Int’l L Comm’n 104, UN
Doc A/CN.4/SerA/1986.
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With the removal of the war nexus and the recognition of crimes
against humanity as an autonomous international crime, the legal
elements excluding isolated, random and individually committed
crimes from the crimes against humanity concept had to be sought
elsewhere. The initiatives that were formulated in this respect pri-
marily focused on the character of the attack in the context of which
the crimes were committed.7 International scholars argued that
crimes may only qualify as crimes against humanity when they are
committed in the context of a widespread or systematic attack that
was instigated or tolerated by a policy or plan of the acting author-
ity.8 Today, the widespread or systematic attack-requirement is
generally recognized as an essential element of crimes against
humanity.9 The legal status of the policy, conversely, continues to be
surrounded by uncertainty and disagreement.
Two diﬀerent views on the legal status of the policy may be dis-
cerned. Both of these views recognize the relevance of the policy for
distinguishing crimes against humanity from ‘‘ordinary’’ crimes falling
within domestic criminal jurisdiction. The disagreement between them
concerns the proper position or characterization of the policy within
the crimes against humanity concept.
The ﬁrst view, expressed by amongst others, William Schabas and
Cherif Bassiouni, considers the recognition of a policy requirement
necessary, if not vital, for distinguishing crimes against humanity
from common domestic crimes.10 Two fundamental arguments are
7 Additionally, there were some proposals to ﬁnd the distinguishing character of
crimes against humanity in the mens rea of the accused by including the requirement
of a discriminatory motive or the exclusion of personal motives. These proposals did,
however, not have a long life. They were promptly rejected by the ICTY in the Tadic´
Appeals Judgment.
8 M. Lippmann, Crimes Against Humanity’ (1997) 17 Boston College Third World
Law Journal 171, 264; Y. Dinstein, Crimes Against Humanity After Tadic´’ (2000) 13
LJIL 373, 379. Also see Hwang (n. 2 above) 489–491; Van Schaack (n. 2 above) 787.
9 W. A. Schabas, UN International Criminal Tribunals: The former Yugoslavia,
Rwanda and Sierra Leone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 191–192;
G. Boas, J. L. Bischoﬀ & N. L. Reid, International Criminal Law Practitioner
Library, Volume 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 35. Also see
Hwang (n. 2 above) 490; Van Schaack (n. 2 above) 850; McAuliﬀe de Guzman (n. 1
above) 375; Mettraux (n. 1 above) 259; Dixon (n. 1 above) 177.
10 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999) 244–246; Schabas, State Policy as an
Element of International Crimes’ (n. 1 above) 982; W. A. Schabas, Prosecuting Dr
Strangelove, Goldﬁnger, and the Joker at the International Criminal Court: Closing
the Loopholes’ (2010) 23 LJIL 847, 853.
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presented for this position. Firstly, it is argued that the policy
requirement addresses concerns about the unqualiﬁed disjunctive test
of the widespread or systematic attack-requirement.11 With the dis-
solution of the war nexus from the chapeau of crimes against humanity
and its replacement with the disjunctive widespread or systematic
attack-test, the crimes against humanity concept arguably became
applicable to widespread, yet unrelated, crimes. The crimes against
humanity concept would thus encompass the criminal acts of serial
killers, maﬁas and motorcycle gangs.12 The policy requirement is
considered essential for the exclusion of such criminal acts from the
scope of crimes against humanity. It ascertains a certain degree of
organization in cases of mere widespread attacks. Secondly, the policy
requirement warrants the involvement of a higher authority in the
commission of crimes against humanity.13 The establishment of some
kind of link with a State or a de facto power in a certain territory by
means of the policy of this entity’ is necessary to ascertain that a town
with an extraordinarily high level of criminality- resulting in a great
number of victims’ could not qualify as a crime-site for crimes against
humanity.14 It follows from these two arguments that these scholars
consider the inclusion of an autonomous policy requirement in the
chapeau of crimes against humanity essential for upholding the
international nature of the concept.
This view is strongly opposed by the second group of scholars.
They hold that the inclusion of the policy requirement in the chapeau
of crimes against humanity is unsubstantiated. Gue´nae¨l Mettraux in
this respect has argued that there is nothing in customary interna-
tional law which mandates the imposition of an additional require-
11 D. Robinson, Deﬁning Crimes Against Humanity at the Rome Conference’
(1999) 93 AJIL 43, 47; Bassiouni (n. 10 above) 244–246; Schabas, State Policy as an
Element of International Crimes’ (n. 1 above) 960.
12 Schabas, State Policy as an Element of International Crimes’ (n. 1 above) 960.
13 Hwang (n. 2 above) 49; Bassiouni (n. 10 above) 249–252; Ambos & Wirth (n. 1
above) 34.
14 Ambos &Wirth (n. 1 above) 34. The authors hold that the intensity’ of this link
diﬀers according to the character of the attack. The policy in the case of a systematic
attack would be to provide at least certain guidance regarding the prospective victims
in order to coordinate the activities of single perpetrators. A systematic attack thus
requires active conduct from the side of the entity behind the policy. (…) A wide-
spread attack which is not at the same time systematic must be one that lacks any
guidance or organization. The policy behind such an attack may be one of mere
deliberate inaction (toleration).’
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ment that the acts be connected to a policy or plan’.15 The policy
requirement thus lacks a legal basis. Furthermore, reference is made to
the redundancy of the incorporation of a policy requirement in the
chapeau of crimes against humanity.16 It is argued that the level of
organization ascertained by the policy requirement is equally upheld
by the civilian population- and widespread or systematic attack-
requirements. The alleged purpose of the policy requirement, the
exclusion of random and isolated acts from the scope of crimes against
humanity, is thus already served by other chapeau elements.17 On the
basis of these two arguments, the second group of scholars argues that
the policy underlying the crimes committed is not an autonomous
element of crime, but an evidentiary factor the court may take into
account in the context of its assessment of the other chapeau elements.
After years of discussion, the debate between the two groups of
scholars appears to have arrived at an impasse. Both groups have
ensconced themselves behind a host of legal sources that apparently
substantiate their respective points of view and are unwilling to leave
their positions. Consensus about the theoretical characterization of
the policy appears to be beyond reach.
This impasse may be broken by supplementing the debate on the
theoretical characterization of the policy with a practical discourse in
which the position, meaning and scope of the policy in the crimes
against humanity concept are analyzed and evaluated on the basis of
the application of this concept by international courts and tribunals
in individual cases. This practical evaluation of the crimes against
humanity concept provides new insights into the value of the inclu-
sion of a policy requirement in the chapeau of crimes against
humanity.
15 Mettraux (n. 1 above) 281–282.
16 See Ambos & Wirth (n. 1 above) 21; Dixon (n. 1 above) 179–180; Werle
(n. 1 above) 300.
17 The Tadic´ Trial Chamber accordingly considered that the term population does
not mean that the entire population of a given state or territory must be victimized;
the expression simply denoted that crimes against humanity must be crimes of col-
lective nature and thus exclude single or isolated acts’. Prosecutor v. Tadic´ (Trial
Judgment) Case No. IT-94-1-T (7 May 1997) [hereinafter Tadic´ Trial Judgment]
para. 644.
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III THE ICTY AND THE POLICY FACTOR
3.1 General Considerations
Article 5 of the ICTY Statute, criminalizing crimes against humanity,
does not explicitly incorporate a policy requirement. In the Tadic´
Trial Chamber judgment, the ICTY however considered that the wish
to exclude isolated and random acts of individuals from the crimes
against humanity concept restricts the concept to crimes committed
in the context of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a
civilian population and implies that there must be some form of a
governmental or organizational policy to commit these acts’.18 In
subsequent jurisprudence, the recognition of the policy as a neces-
sarily implicit requirement of crimes against humanity was, however,
increasingly questioned and critically observed.19 This ultimately
resulted in the explicit rejection of the policy requirement in the
Kunarac Appeals Chamber judgment. The Chamber held that
[N]either the attack nor the acts of the accused needs to be supported by any form of
‘‘policy’’ or ‘‘plan’’. There was nothing in the Statute or in customary international
law at the time of the alleged acts which required proof of the existence of a plan or
policy to commit these crimes. (…) [P]roof that the attack was directed against a
civilian population and that it was widespread or systematic, are legal elements of
the crime. But to prove these elements, it is not necessary to show that they were the
result of the existence of a policy or plan. It may be useful in establishing that the
attack was directed against a civilian population and that it was widespread or
systematic (especially the latter) to show that there was in fact a policy or plan, but it
may be possible to prove these things by reference to other matters. Thus the exis-
18 Tadic´ Trial Judgment (n. 17 above) paras. 644 and 653. The ICTR similarly
considered that the policy requirement is inherent in the systematic attack require-
ment’ when it held that [t]he concept of ‘‘systematic’’ may be deﬁned as thoroughly
organized and following a regular pattern on the basis of a common policy involving
substantial public or private resources. There is no requirement that this policy is
formally adopted as the policy of a state. There must however be some kind of
preconceived plan or policy’. Prosecutor v. Akayesu (Trial Judgment) Case No.
ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) para. 580. Also see Prosecutor v. Kayishema &
Ruzindana (Trial Judgment) Case No. ICTR-95-1-T (21 May 1999) paras. 123–124.
19 See Prosecutor v. Kupresˇkic´ et al. (Trial Judgment) Case No. IT-95-16-T (14
January 2000) [hereinafter Kupresˇkic´ et al. Trial Judgment] paras. 551–555; Prose-
cutor v. Kordic´ & Cˇerkez (Trial Judgment) Case No. IT-95-14/2-T (26 February 2001)
[hereinafter Kordic´ & Cˇerkez Trial Judgment] para. 182; Prosecutor v. Jelisic´ (Appeal
Judgment) Case No. IT-95-10-A (5 July 2001) para. 48.
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tence of a plan or policy may be evidentially relevant, but it is not a legal element of
the crime.20
The characterization of the policy underlying the crimes committed
as a ‘‘mere’’ evidentiary relevant circumstance, or relevant factor, was
continuously aﬃrmed in later judgments.21
In elaborating on the character of the policy factor, the ICTY held
that the policy underlying the crimes should entail the commission of
a multiplicity of criminal acts against a civilian population.22 This
does not imply that the policy needs to be formally adopted or de-
clared either expressly or precisely.23 The policy may be inferred from
the totality of the factual circumstances. The Blasˇkic´ Trial Chamber
in this respect considered that the existence of a plan may be deduced
from inter alia: the general historical circumstances and the overall
political background; the establishment and implementation of
autonomous political structures; the general content of the political
programme; media propaganda; the establishment and implementa-
tion of autonomous military structures; the mobilization of armed
forces; the execution of temporally and geographically repeated and
co-ordinated military oﬀensives; the existence of links between the
military hierarchy and the political structure and its programme; the
20 Prosecutor v. Kunurac (Appeal Judgment) Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A
(12 June 2002) [hereinafter Kunurac Appeal Judgment] para. 98.
21 See Prosecutor v. Krstic´ (Appeal Judgment) Case No. IT-98-33-A (19 April
2004) [hereinafter Krstic´ Appeal Judgment] para. 225; Prosecutor v. Blasˇkic´ (Appeal
Judgment) Case No. IT-95-14-A (29 July 2004) [hereinafter Blasˇkic´ Appeal Judg-
ment] para. 100; Prosecutor v. Limaj et al. (Trial Judgment) Case No. IT-03-66-T (30
November 2005) [hereinafter Limaj Trial Judgment] para. 184; Prosecutor v. Martic´
(Trial Judgment) Case No. IT-95-11-T (12 June 2007) [hereinafter Martic´ Trial
Judgment] para. 49. This jurisprudential development may similarly be observed at
the ICTR. Whereas the ﬁrst judgments held that the policy requirement is inherent in
the systematic attack’ requirement, in the later jurisprudence, the ICTR adopted a
more expansive interpretation of the term systematic’. See Prosecutor v. Semanza
(Appeal Judgment) Case No. ICTR-97-20-A (20 May 2005) para. 269; Prosecutor v.
Gacumbitsi (Appeal Judgment) Case No. ICTR-2001-64-A (7 July 2006) para. 84;
Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al. (Appeal Judgment) Case No. ICTR-99-55-A (28
November 2007) para. 922; Prosecutor v. Seromba (Appeal Judgment) Case No.
ICTR-2001-66-A (12 March 2008) para. 149.
22 Tadic´ Trial Judgment, para. 653.
23 Tadic´ Trial Judgment, para. 653; Kupresˇkic´ et al. Trial Judgment, para. 552;
Prosecutor v. Nikolic´ (Review of the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence) Case No. IT-94-2-R61 (20 October 1995) [hereinafter
Nikolic´ Rule 61 Decision] para. 26; Prosecutor v. Blasˇkic´ (Trial Judgment) Case No.
IT-95-14-T (3 March 2000) [hereinafter Blasˇkic´ Trial Judgment] para. 204.
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occurrence of alterations in the ethnic composition of populations;
the imposition of discriminatory measures; and the scale of the vio-
lence perpetrated.24
Furthermore, the ICTY consistently held that the established
policy does not need to be that of a de jure state.25 Forces which,
although not part of the legitimate government, have de facto control
over, or are able to move freely within the deﬁned territory may be
just as capable as states of implementing a policy that leads to the
commission of crimes against humanity. They can therefore be held
equally criminally responsible for such crimes. Whether the policy is
implemented by a de jure state or a de facto power, the policy does
not need to be conceived at the highest hierarchical level.26 It may be
developed at any level of the state or organization that exercises de
facto power over the territory.
3.2 Factual Application of the Systematic Attack-Requirement
Since the ICTY does not consider the policy as an autonomous ele-
ment of crimes against humanity, it is not individually evaluated.
Instead, the policy factor is analyzed and evaluated in the context of
the systematic attack-requirement. The factual circumstances the
ICTY uses, either explicitly or implicitly, to assess the systematic
character of the attack, vary. They can be divided into three distinct
categories: circumstances concerning the preparation of the attack;
circumstances concerning the characteristics of the attack; and con-
textual circumstances.27
24 Blasˇkic´ Trial Judgment, para. 204. The reasoning of the Blasˇkic´ Trial Judgment
concerning the policy underlying the crimes committed was addressed on appeal. The
Appeals Chamber held that is was unclear whether the Trial Chamber deemed the
existence of a plan to be a legal element of crime and aﬃrmed previous jurisprudence
that qualiﬁes the policy as evidentially relevant in proving that the crime was com-
mitted against a civilian population and was widespread or systematic in character
(para. 100, 120). However, the Appeals Chamber did not reject the Trial Chamber’s
reference to the enumerated factual circumstances. These circumstances will there-
fore be considered accepted as evidence of a plan or policy underlying the crimes
committed.
25 Tadic´ Trial Judgment, para. 654; Kupresˇkic´ et al. Trial Judgment, para. 552.
26 Nikolic´ Rule 61 Decision, para. 26; Blasˇkic´ Trial Judgment, para. 205.
27 Some of the circumstances may be classiﬁed under multiple (sub)categories. The
categories thus to some extent overlap. However, this does not fundamentally de-
value the categorization as the factual circumstances get a diﬀerent colour in each of
the three categories.
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In the context of the ﬁrst category reference is made to, inter alia:
preparatory meetings held between oﬃcials and citizens during which
the possibility of an attack is discussed28; pre-emptive warnings of an
imminent attack given by the oﬃcials to citizens from their ethnic
group to give them the opportunity to leave the area before the at-
tack29; the training of military personnel30; the increased presence or
control of military troops31; unusual troop movements32; the pur-
chase and distribution of arms33; the installation of roadblocks and
barricades leading to the villages34; and the imposition of a curfew
and discriminatory measures.35
The second category of factual circumstances is concerned with
the characteristics of the attack itself. These characteristics ﬁrstly
relate to the means and methods of attack. In this respect attention
may be paid to the complexity and organized character of the at-
tack36; the co-ordination amongst and between the diﬀerent troops
involved in the attack37; and the type and amount of armaments
used.38 Secondly, reference is made to the consequences of the attack.
In particular, evidence indicating the devastating and discriminatory
28 Blasˇkic´ Trial Judgment, para. 389; Kordic´ & Cˇerkez Trial Judgment, paras. 610–
613, 630; Martic´ Trial Judgment, para. 303.
29 See Blasˇkic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 389, 573, 624; Kordic´ & Cˇerkez Trial Judg-
ment, para. 645; Prosecutor v. Kordic´ & Cˇerkez (Appeal Judgment) Case No. IT-95-
14/2-A (17 December 2004) [hereinafter Kordic´ & Cˇerkez Appeal Judgment] para.
511.
30 See Martic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 144–148.
31 See Blasˇkic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 359, 390, 504; Prosecutor v. Mrksˇic´ et al.
(Trial Judgment) Case No. IT-95-13/1-T (27 September 2007) [hereinafter Mrksˇic´
et al. Trial Judgment] para. 465.
32 See Blasˇkic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 390, 504.
33 See Blasˇkic´ Trial Judgment, para. 504.
34 See Blasˇkic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 350, 361, 624; Mrksˇic´ et al. Trial Judgment,
para. 470.
35 See Blasˇkic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 359, 388, 411–412, 512; Martic´ Trial Judg-
ment, paras. 227, 349, 351.
36 See Blasˇkic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 503, 506; Mrksˇic´ et al. Trial Judgment,
paras. 43, 472.
37 See Blasˇkic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 401, 624; Kordic´ & Cˇerkez Trial Judgment,
para. 637; Martic´ Trial Judgment, para. 351.
38 See Kordic´ & Cˇerkez Trial Judgment, para. 635; Mrksˇic´ et al. Trial Judgment,
para. 470.
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consequences of the attack is considered relevant for establishing the
organized and thus systematic character of the attack.39
The factual circumstances in the third category diﬀer from the
previously mentioned circumstances in the sense that they are not
limited to one speciﬁc attack. Instead, they describe the overall
context of violence. This context ﬁrstly entails the political back-
ground against which the attack took place. In this respect, reference
may be made to the issuance of a declaration of independence by one
of the parties to the conﬂict40; the concentration of political and
military power within speciﬁc institutions and their increased control
over daily life41; the issuance of warnings from one ethnic group
against another to leave the area42; the issuance and expiration of
ultimata that force certain ethnic groups to disarm and/or to be
subject to the power of another43; the expression of nationalistic
statements or calls for violence by politicians in the media or during
meetings44; and, ﬁnally, the imposition of discriminatory measures
possibly leading to changes in the ethnic composition of the area.45
The second element that determines the context of the attack is the
overall scale of the crimes committed. This scale is deﬁned in terms of
both the total number of crimes committed and the consequences of
the attacks.46 The third contextual element concerns the relations
between the various crimes and/or attacks committed. This element
does not so much describe the character of the context in which the
attack took place, but rather determines the scope of the context. On
the basis of the relations between the individual crimes and/or
39 See Blasˇkic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 411–412, 512; Kordic´ & Cˇerkez Trial Judg-
ment, paras. 635, 643; Martic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 227, 349, 351; Mrksˇic´ et al.
Trial Judgment, paras. 55–59, 465–469, 472.
40 See Blasˇkic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 129, 136, 344; Kordic´ & Cˇerkez Trial Judg-
ment, para. 472; Martic´ Trial Judgment, para. 473; Mrksˇic´ et al. Trial Judgment,
paras. 20, 32.
41 See Blasˇkic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 344, 359, 361, 364; Kordic´ & Cˇerkez Trial
Judgment, paras. 481–491, 496; Martic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 131, 135, 137, 139,
149–158.
42 See Blasˇkic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 389, 573, 624.
43 See Blasˇkic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 353–355, 359, 361, 545; Kordic´ & Cˇerkez
Trial Judgment, paras. 499, 603, 649; Martic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 164, 166.
44 See Blasˇkic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 341, 387, 496, 538; Martic´ Trial Judgment,
para. 166; Mrksˇic´ et al. Trial Judgment, paras. 24–25.
45 See Blasˇkic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 361, 365–366.
46 See Kordic´ & Cˇerkez Trial Judgment, paras. 635, 750.
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attacks, the Tribunal may be able to establish a pattern of crimes
consisting of similar criminal conduct that deﬁnes the larger context of
violence within which the individual crimes were committed. The
relations between the crimes and/or attacks committed, may be as-
sessed in terms of their temporal and geographical scope; the means
andmethods of attack; the troops thatwere involved; the type of crimes
committed and the consequences thereof.47
3.3 Factual Application of the Policy Factor
In what way is the policy factor reﬂected in the ICTY’s evaluation of
the systematic attack-requirement on the basis of the three categories of
factual circumstances discussed above? This questionmay be answered
by observing the application of the systematic attack-requirement in
light of the factual circumstances theBlasˇkic´Trial Chamber considered
indicative of a policy underlying the crimes committed. It is possible to
identify that the ‘‘Blasˇkic´ policy circumstances’’ are analogous to the
contextual circumstances referred to with respect to the systematic
attack-requirement. The policy factor thus appears to manifest itself in
the ICTY’s use of contextual circumstances in its assessment of the
systematic character of the attack.
The case law illustrates that the contextual circumstances hold an
important position in the ICTY’s evaluation of the systematic attack-
requirement. In particular, the use of contextual circumstances that
establish the relations between the crimes and/or attacks committed, is
central in the assessment of the systematic character of the attack. In
light of its understanding that the improbability of the accidental
occurrence of a pattern of similar criminal conduct, is a common
expression of the systematic occurrence of acts of violence’,48 the
ICTY has regularly substantiated the systematic character of the at-
tack on the basis of the pattern of the crimes committed.49 In Mrksˇic´
47 See Blasˇkic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 573, 624; Kordic´ & Cˇerkez Trial Judgment,
paras. 520, 576, 642–643, 665, 667, 723, 750, 802;Martic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 351,
427; Mrksˇic´ et al. Trial Judgment, para. 472; Kordic´ & Cˇerkez Appeal Judgment,
paras. 449, 667–668; Prosecutor v. Martic´ (Appeal Judgment) Case No. IT-95-11-A
(8 October 2008) [hereinafter Martic´ Appeal Judgment] para. 318.
48 See Kunurac Appeals Judgment, para 94; Blasˇkic´ Appeals Judgment, para. 101;
Kordic´ & Cˇerkez Appeal Judgment, para. 94; Martic´ Trial Judgment, para. 49.
49 See Blasˇkic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 573, 624, 750; Kordic´ & Cˇerkez Appeal
Judgment, paras. 667–668; Martic´ Trial Judgment, para. 349; Mrksˇic´ et al. Trial
Judgment, paras. 19–37, 43, 472. Less explicit, but certainly not less relevant in this
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et al. the Trial Chamber, for example, held that the systematic
character of the attack was evidenced by the JNA’s approach to the
taking of each village or town and the damage done therein’.50 In
particular, the fact that the troops followed similar lines of attack in
each of the attacked villages and the indiscriminate manner in which
the attack was executed, were considered relevant in this respect.51
In this manner, the Mrksˇic´ Trial Chamber established a factual
relationship between the various crimes and/or attacks committed. In
Kordic´ and Cˇerkez, the Appeals Chamber conversely adopted a more
abstract approach in its evaluation of the relations between the vari-
ous crimes and/or attacks. It qualiﬁed the attack as systematic on the
basis of the mere similarity of the legal qualiﬁcations of the crimes that
were committed (e.g. murder and inhumane acts) within certain
temporal and geographical limits.52
The ICTY’s assessment of the systematic attack-requirement on
the basis of the relations between the various attacks and/or crimes
committed, appears to be essential in light of the objective of
excluding random acts of violence from the scope of crimes against
humanity. Evidence of preparation for attacks and the organized and
co-ordinated manner in which these attacks were executed may well
indicate that the attack was pre-meditated or purposely executed in
this manner. However, it does not exclude isolated incidents from the
crimes against humanity concept. The exclusion of such incidents is
only ascertained by the establishment of a relationship between the
various crimes and/or attacks committed. In this way, the individual
Footnote 49 continued
respect, is the ICTY’s evaluation of the crimes committed per region and its frequent
description of the political and military context in which the crimes were committed.
50 Mrksˇic´ et al. Trial Judgment, para. 472.
51 The system of attack employed by the JNA typically evolved along the fol-
lowing lines; (a) tension, confusion and fear is built up by a military presence around
a village and provocative behavior; (b) there is then artillery or mortar shelling for
several days, mostly aimed at the Croatian parts of the village; in this stage churches
are often hit and destroyed; (c) in nearly all cases JNA ultimata are issued to the
people of a village demanding the collection and delivery to the JNA of all weapons;
village delegations are formed but their consultations with JNA military authorities
do not lead, with the exception of Ilok, to peaceful arrangements; with or without
waiting for the results of the ultimata a military attack is carried out; and (d) at the
same time, or shortly after the attack, Serb paramilitaries enter the village; what then
follows varies from murder, killing, burning and looting to discrimination.’ Mrksˇic´
et al. Trial Judgment, para. 43.
52 Kordic´ & Cˇerkez Appeal Judgment, paras. 667–668.
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crimes and/or attacks are taken out of their isolation and linked to
the larger context of violence. The contextual circumstances are
essential for establishing this link.
The ‘‘factual method’’ that was employed by theMrksˇic´ et al. Trial
Chamber must in this respect be preferred over the ‘‘abstract meth-
od’’ adopted by the Kordic´ and Cˇerkez Appeals Chamber. The mere
equivalence of legal qualiﬁcations does not adequately establish an
empirical relation between the various incidents. It consequently does
not suﬃciently assure the exclusion of random, individual crimes that
are unrelated to the larger context of violence.
Summarizing, it can be concluded that the contextual circum-
stances hold an essential and central position in the ICTY’s evalua-
tion of the systematic attack-requirement. As these contextual
circumstances are analogous to the ‘‘Blasˇkic´ policy circumstances’’,
the factual establishment of a policy has arguably become the prin-
cipal indicator of the systematic character of the attack. The critical
attitude of the ICTY versus the policy as an element of crime has thus
not prevented the Tribunal from placing the policy factor at the core
of its evaluation of the systematic attack-requirement.
IV THE ICC AND THE POLICY REQUIREMENT
4.1 General Considerations
In contrast to the ICTY Statute, the Rome Statute of the ICC in
Article 7 explicitly incorporates a policy element in the chapeau of
crimes against humanity. The article reads as follows
(1) For the purpose of this Statute, crime against humanity’ means
any of the following acts when committed as part of a wide-
spread or systematic attack directed against any civilian popu-
lation, with knowledge of the attack: (…)
(2) Attack directed against any civilian population’ means a course
of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to
in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such
attack.53
During the drafting negotiations, the delegates agreed that crimes
against humanity should be restricted to crimes committed within a
larger context of organized violence. They however disagreed on the
53 UN Doc A/CONF. 183/9 (emphasis added).
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manner in which this objective should be accomplished. On the one
hand, a number of delegations argued that the disjunctive widespread
or systematic attack-test may lead to the inclusion of a spontaneous
wave of unrelated crimes in the crimes against humanity concept.54
Since this is contrary to the objective of excluding randomly com-
mitted criminal conduct from the scope of crimes against humanity,
these delegates considered it necessary to establish a cumulative
relation between the qualiﬁers of the attack. On the other hand, a
second group of delegates argued that the widespread or systematic
attack- and civilian population-requirements suﬃciently assure the
exclusion of random and isolated acts from the crimes against
humanity concept.55
A compromise between the two opposing groups was reached by
supplementing the widespread or systematic attack-requirement with
a policy element. By incorporating this element in the deﬁnition of the
attack directed against any civilian population’, this deﬁnition does
not only comprise of a quantitative element (course of conduct
involving the multiple commission of acts’), but also of a qualitative
element (the policy element). Both these elements ought to be fulﬁlled
in the case of either a widespread or a systematic attack. The policy
element thus ascertains a certain level of organization in the case of a
mere widespread attack and assures that random acts committed
pursuant to an individual plan cannot qualify as crimes against
humanity.56
The exact meaning of the policy element remained largely unde-
cided at the Rome Conference. Whereas some scholars argued that a
policy is something akin to systematicity’,57 others held that the
policy element is more ﬂexible’ and does not require the high degree
of organization and orchestration characteristic of the systematic
attack-requirement.58 Further clarity on the character of the policy
element can be gleaned from the emerging jurisprudence of the ICC.
In its decision on the conﬁrmation of charges against Katanga and
Ngudjolo Chui, Pre-Trial Chamber I held that the policy element,
54 Robinson (n. 11 above) 47; McAuliﬀe deGuzman (n. 1 above) 372.
55 Robinson (n. 11 above) 47.
56 M. Elewa Badar, From the Nuremberg Charter to the Rome Statute: Deﬁning
the Elements of Crimes Against Humanity’ (2004) 5 San Diego International Law
Journal 112, 116; Werle (n. 2 above) 300.
57 Boas, Bischoﬀ & Reid (n. 9 above) 106–107.
58 Robinson (n. 11 above) 48, 50–51; McAuliﬀe deGuzman (n. 1 above) 374;
Badar (n. 56 above) 115.
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[E]nsures that the attack, even if carried out over a large geographical area or di-
rected against a large number of victims, must still be thoroughly organized and
follow a regular pattern. It must also be conducted in furtherance of a common
policy involving public and private resources. (…) An attack which is planned,
directed or organized – as opposed to spontaneous or isolated acts of violence – will
satisfy this criterion.’59
This interpretation of the policy element has been understood as
introducing a particularly high threshold. It was even argued that
Pre-Trial Chamber I has, in this way, interpreted the policy element
as being synonymous with the systematic attack-requirement,60
thereby eﬀectively replacing the alternative widespread or systematic
attack’ requirement with a cumulative widespread and systematic
attack’ requirement.
A conﬁrmation of the synonymous meaning of the policy element
and the systematic attack-requirement may be found in the Pre-Trial
Chamber’s interpretation of the term systematic’:
The term systematic’ has been understood as either an organized plan in furtherance
of a common policy, which follows a regular pattern and results in a continuous
commission of acts or as patterns of crimes’ such that the crimes constitute a non-
accidental repetition of similar criminal conduct on a regular basis.61
The required form of the policy is further expanded upon in Article
7(3) of the Elements of Crime. Article 7(3) holds that the policy to
commit such attack requires that the state or organization actively
promote or encourage such an attack against a civilian population’.
Pre-Trial Chamber I considered that this means that the attack
59 Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui (Decision on the Conﬁrmation of Charges) ICC-
01/04-01/07 (30 September 2008) [hereinafter Katanga Conﬁrmation of Charges]
para. 396.
60 M. Halling, Push the Envelop – Watch it Bend: Removing the Policy
Requirement and Extending Crimes Against Humanity’ (2010) 23 LJIL 827, 836–
837.
61 Katanga Conﬁrmation of Charges, para 397. The (evidential) relationship be-
tween the systematic attack requirement and the policy element may also be observed
in Prosecutor v. Harun & Kushayb (Decision on the Prosecution’s Application under
Article 58 (7) of the Statute) ICC-02/05-01/07 (27 April 2007) [hereinafter Harun &
Kushayb Decision on the Application of Article 58(7)] para 62. The Pre-Trial
Chamber considered that systematic refers to the organized nature of the acts of
violence and the improbability of their random occurrence. The Chamber is also of
the view that the existence of a state or organizational policy is an element from
which the systematic nature of an attack may be inferred’.
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should be planned, directed or organized.62 This does not imply that
the policy needs to be explicitly deﬁned or formalized.63 The existence
and content of the policy may, instead, be deduced from the
occurrence of a series of events’.64 In this respect, reference may be
made to the factual circumstances listed in the Blasˇkic´ Trial Chamber
judgment.65
Article 7(2) of the Rome Statute explicitly recognizes both states
and organizations as possible entities behind a policy pursuant to, or
in furtherance of, which crimes against humanity were committed.
The meaning and scope of the term organization’ is controversial
and has been extensively debated.66 Pre-Trial Chamber II on this
point held that:
62 Katanga Conﬁrmation of Charges, para. 396.
63 Katanga Conﬁrmation of Charges, para. 396; Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo
(Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo) ICC-01/05-01/08 (10 June 2008) [hereinafter Bemba Appli-
cation for a Warrant of Arrest] para. 81.
64 Katanga Conﬁrmation of Charges, para. 396; Situation in the Republic of Kenya
(Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya) ICC-01/09 (31 March
2010) [hereinafter Kenya Authorization Decision] para. 84.
65 Kenya Authorization Decision, para. 87. The factual circumstances considered
relevant by the Blasˇkic´ Trial Chamber are listed in section 3.1 of this article. This use
of the ICTY’s jurisprudence to interpret the Rome Statute is criticized by Judge Kaul
in his dissenting opinion to this decision. Judge Kaul holds that [j]urisprudential
references to the ad hoc tribunals and that of other hybrid tribunals, such as the
Special Court for Sierra Leone (‘‘SCSL’’), are, in my opinion, to be treated with
utmost caution (…) A cautious approach is even more warranted in the event that
the basic texts of other courts and tribunals do not contain the same legal require-
ments in a provision as contained in the Court’s Statute. In this respect, it is worth
noting that the pertinent provisions in the statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR do not
contain expressis verbis a legal requirement equivalent to that of Article 7(2)(a) of the
Rome Statute, namely the legal requirement of a State or organizational policy’.
(paras. 28 and 31, footnotes omitted).
66 See Schabas, State Policy as an Element of International Crimes’ (n. 1 above)
953–982; Werle (n. 1 above) 301. Also see W. A. Schabas, Crimes Against
Humanity: The State Plan or Policy Element’, in L. N. Sadat & M. P. Scharf (eds.),
The Theory and Practice of International Criminal Law, Essays in Honour of
M. Cherif Bassiouni (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoﬀ Publishers, 2008) 347; Claus
Kreb, On the Outer Limits of Crimes Against Humanity: The Concept or Organi-
zation Within the Policy Requirement: Some Reﬂections on the March 2010 Kenya
Decision’ (2010) 23 LJIL 855.
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[T]he formal nature of a group and the level of its organization should not be the
deﬁning criterion. Instead, as others have convincingly put forward, a distinction
should be drawn on whether a group has the capability to perform acts which
infringe on basic human values.67
The majority of the Pre-Trial Chamber thus included purely private
organizations that are capable of setting up and carrying out a policy to
commit an attack in the crimes against humanity concept. This inter-
pretation of organizational’ remains, however, highly controversial.68 It
is hoped that future ICC judgments will oﬀer some clarity on this point.
4.2 Reservations
Before engaging in an analysis of the ICC’s case law, two reservations
should be made at the outset. Firstly, any analysis of the ICC’s case
law is limited somewhat by virtue of the fact that as a relatively young
court, it has rendered only a small number of relevant decisions,
which in and of themselves are not entirely consistent. As such, it is as
yet impossible to speak of the ICC’s position or to identify a deﬁn-
itive line of reasoning. With regard to the policy element, for exam-
ple, it is possible to observe two diverse understandings and two
related means of application of the law in the decisions of the Pre-
Trial Chambers. On the one hand, Pre-Trial Chamber I has brought
the policy element under the heading and within the context of the
systematic attack-requirement. This Pre-Trial Chamber, for example,
considered that the attack against the civilian population of Bogoro
village was part of a systematic attack because the violent acts were
not random acts of violence against the civilian population, but were
committed pursuant to a common policy and an organised common
plan’.69 In adopting this reasoning, the Pre-Trial Chamber appears to
67 Kenya Authorization Decision, para. 90.
68 In an extensive dissenting opinion Judge Kaul concluded that both textual and
teleological arguments lead to a more restricted interpretation of the term organi-
zational’ that is limited to state-like’ organizations. [T]he juxtaposition of the no-
tions ‘‘State’’ and ‘‘organization’’ in article 7(2)(a) of the Statute are an indication
that even though the constitutive elements of statehood need not be established those
‘‘organizations’’ should partake of some characteristics of a State. Those charac-
teristics eventually turn the private ‘‘organization’’ into an entity which may act like
a State or has quasi-State abilities’ (Dissenting opinion Judge Kaul para. 51). For an
academic comment on the decision see Kreb (n. 66 above) 855–873.
69 Katanga Conﬁrmation of Charges, para. 413. See also Bemba Application for a
Warrant of Arrest, para. 33; Harun & Kushayb Decision on the Application of
Article 58(7), paras. 62–67.
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consider the existence of a policy as an evidentiary relevant circum-
stance for the establishment of the systematic character of an attack.
On the other hand, in the Decision on the Authorization of an In-
vestigation into the Situation of the Republic of Kenya (Kenya
decision) Pre-Trial Chamber II viewed the policy element separately
from the widespread or systematic-requirement.70 It thus character-
ized the policy element as an autonomous element of crime. In future
decisions, the ICC will have to provide further certainty on the
proper application and evaluation of the policy element. Until that
time, it remains diﬃcult to make conclusive statements about the
ICC’s understanding of the character and position of the policy ele-
ment.
Secondly, academic research into the practical application of the
law by the ICC is aﬀected by the inherently limited factual evaluation
that takes place in pre-trial decisions. As pre-trial decisions are ren-
dered before the examination of the facts underlying the charges
against the accused, they cannot and do not include an extensive
factual substantiation of the decision. The Pre-Trial Chamber deci-
sion that best provides preliminary insights into the way in which the
court applies the crimes against humanity concept to the facts of a
speciﬁc case, is Pre-Trial Chamber II’s Kenya decision. This decision
will therefore form the basis for the further assessment of the prac-
tical application of the policy element by the ICC. It should, however,
be kept in mind that this assessment is merely preliminary and that its
ﬁndings may need adjustment in response to future developments.
4.3 Factual Application of the Policy Element
In the Kenya decision, Pre-Trial Chamber II refers to a variety of fac-
tual circumstances to substantiate its decision that an organizational
policy underlies the crimes committed. The circumstances the Pre-Trial
Chamber refers to can be divided into the same three categories as
discerned in the context of the ICTY’s systematic attack-analysis,
namely: circumstances relating to the preparation for attack, circum-
stances concerning the characteristics of the attack and those deﬁning
the political, military and social context in which the attack took place.
In the context of the preparation category the ICC refers inter alia
to: meetings of local leaders, businessmen and politicians during
which the violence was coordinated and weapons and money were
70 Kenya Authorization Decision, paras. 115–128.
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distributed71; the training in camps72; the enlistment of gangs to
unleash violence on perceived rival communities73; and the warnings
that were given to people in anticipation of the violence.74 The second
category of circumstances relating to the characteristics of the attack
concern: the coordinated and organized manner of attack; the large
size of the groups that carried out attacks from diﬀerent directions;
and the fact that the troops fought in shifts.75 Additionally, the Pre-
Trial Chamber takes account of the materials and types of armament
used in the course of the attack. The factual circumstances that fall
within the third contextual category concern the evidence of public
statements by politicians in the media or on leaﬂets in which the
violent aim of the attack is articulated and the execution of simul-
taneous attacks on diﬀerent villages.
This application and substantiation of the policy element in the
Kenya decision gives rise to two observations. Firstly, it appears that
Pre-Trial Chamber II adopts a broader understanding of the policy
requirement than the ICTY. Whereas in the ICTY’s jurisprudence the
policy factor is reﬂected in the contextual circumstances, the ICC’s
Pre-Trial Chamber II evaluates the policy element by observing the
entire range of factual circumstances relevant for establishing the
systematic character of the attack. By doing so, the policy element
and the systematic attack-requirement may in practice become
analogous concepts.
This analogous understanding of the policy element and the sys-
tematic attack-requirement is also illustrated by the ICC’s practice of
substantiating these two elements in an interchangeable manner. The
policy element and the systematic attack-requirement appear to
operate as ‘‘communicating vessels’’. When either of these elements is
established on the basis of an evaluation of the factual circumstances,
the other is ascertained without further substantiation. In the decision
on the conﬁrmation of charges against Katanga and Chui Pre-Trial
Chamber I, for example, concluded that the attack on Bogora village
was systematic in character on the basis of the pattern of attacks. This
ﬁnding was based on the common characteristics of the attacks
committed; the large scale of the attack; the large number of persons
71 Ibid., paras. 118–119.
72 Ibid., para. 119.
73 Ibid., para. 127.
74 Ibid., para. 120.
75 Ibid., para. 121.
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targeted; and the organized common plan underlying the acts of
violence.76 The existence of the policy underlying the crimes com-
mitted was subsequently accepted without further substantiation. This
contrasts with the approach of Pre-Trial Chamber II in the Kenya
decision where it established the policy element on the basis of rela-
tively extensive reasoning and factual evidence, while later accepting
the systematic attack-requirement without further substantiation.
A second observation concerning the factual substantiation of the
policy element in the Kenya decision, is that the contextual circum-
stances appeared to play a limited role in the Pre-Trial Chamber’s
reasoning. The Pre-Trial Chamber’s conclusion that a policy is
underlying the crimes committed is primarily based on the prepara-
tory measures that were taken and the characteristics of the attack.
These two observations illustrate that the inclusion of a policy
element in the chapeau of crimes against humanity has so far not led
to a more central focus on the policy by means of an extensive
evaluation of the contextual circumstances.
4.4 Evaluation
The case law analysis indicates that the inclusion of the policy ele-
ment in the Rome Statute has not resulted in a more prominent role
for the policy in the crimes against humanity concept. Despite their
diﬀerent theoretical understanding and characterization of the policy,
the ICTY and ICC evaluate it in a comparable manner. With this
analysis in mind, it is argued that the theoretical diﬀerentiation be-
tween the policy as either an element of crime or as an evidentiary
relevant circumstance is, in essence, merely academic. This conclusion
may lead some commentators to argue that this is more a deﬁciency
in the application of the law than of the law itself. The fact that the
policy element has little added value to the systematic attack-
requirement is not a consequence of inaccurate rule-making, but of
improper rule-application. The policy element is explicitly recognized
in the Rome Statute as an element of crimes against humanity. The
ICC thus has the obligation to give eﬀect to the element as such.
Indeed, it must be acknowledged that the inclusion of a policy ele-
ment as an autonomous requirement of crimes against humanity can
have restrictive value. The fact that the policy element is explicitly
included in the Rome Statute obliges the ICC to evaluate this element
in every case that comes before it. With this in mind, the ICC’s
76 Katanga Conﬁrmation of Charges, paras. 412–416.
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interchangeable substantiation of the policy element and the sys-
tematic attack-requirement must be criticized. Even though this
practice is understandable in view of the factual analogy between the
policy element and the systematic attack-requirement (why would the
Chamber engage in the same factual substantiation twice?), by
observing the two elements of crime in this alternative manner, the
Pre-Trial Chambers deny the policy element and systematic attack-
requirement their character and position as autonomous and neces-
sary conditions of crime that should be individually established and
substantiated in every case.77
At the same time, it must be observed that the meaning, scope,
position and restrictive value of the policy cannot be determined by
the mere inclusion of a policy element in a Statute. As the elements of
crime are formulated in relatively abstract and general terms, they
can be customized to the factual situation to which they are applied.
This is clearly illustrated by the ICTY’s evaluation of the crimes
against humanity concept.78 Through its speciﬁc interpretation and
application of the chapeau elements of crimes against humanity, the
ICTY has ascertained both objectives of the policy element, namely
the exclusion of random large-scale crimes and the exclusion of
crimes committed pursuant to individual plans or in furtherance of
the policy of private organizations not exercising de facto authority
without recognizing the policy as an element of crimes against
humanity. With respect to the ﬁrst of these objectives, four charac-
teristics of the ICTY’s jurisprudence should be discerned.
First, the ICTY has applied the systematic attack-requirement in a
manner that emphasizes the larger context of organized violence in
which the crimes are committed. By emphasizing the contextual cir-
cumstances the Tribunal ensures that isolated incidents are excluded
from the crimes against humanity concept. Second, the ICTY’s char-
acterization of the attack as systematic generally coincides with its
qualiﬁcation as widespread.79 There are thus hardly any cases of mere
large scale violence in which the establishment of a policy underlying
the crimes committed has a restrictive inﬂuence. Third, in those cases in
which the ICTY did qualify the attack as merely widespread, reference
77 In this light also see Dissenting Opinion Judge Kaul with the Kenya Authori-
zation Decision, paras. 31–32.
78 For the ICTY, the elements of crime are not laid down in the Statute, but have
been explicated in case law.
79 Schabas, UN International Criminal Tribunals (n. 9 above) 192; Boas, Bischoﬀ &
Reid (n. 9 above) 107.
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was still made to the contextual circumstances that linked the wide-
spread crimes to each other. In this manner, the ICTY still construed a
situation of organized violence.80 Fourth, the link between the various
individual crimes committed may be ascertained by the requirements
that the attack is committed in the context of an armed conﬂict and
directed against a civilian population. Both these elements establish a
connection between the individual crimes and the larger context of
violence. This approach has ensured that the ICTY recognizes the
organized character of crimes against humanity. Despite its rejection
of the policy as a necessary element of crimes against humanity, the
Tribunal has thus formed and applied the crimes against humanity
concept in suchmanner as to ascertain the exclusion of widespread, yet
unrelated, crimes from the crimes against humanity concept.
The second objective of the policy element, the ascertainment of
the involvement of a high-level authority in the crimes, is upheld
because the contextual circumstances listed and referred to by the
ICTY in the context of the systematic attack-requirement mostly
refer to the implication of a higher authority.81 They establish a link
between the individual crime and the political, military or institu-
tional context in which the crime was committed. Crimes committed
pursuant to an individual plan are thus excluded from the scope of
crimes against humanity.
The fact that the ICTY has ascertained the objectives of the policy
element despite its rejection of the policy as an autonomous element of
crimes against humanity is, of course, no guarantee that future courts
will operate in a similar manner and achieve a similar result. The spe-
ciﬁc, relatively unproblematic, application of the crimes against
humanity concept by the ICTY is connected to and depends on the
character of the cases brought before this tribunal. The cases concern
crimes that were committed during an (inter)national armed conﬂict
between multiple ethnic groups. Furthermore, the crimes were mostly
executed in an organized manner pursuant to a policy. The factual
context inwhich the crimes were committed, was thus of such character
80 See Martic´ Trial Judgment, para. 469.
81 The Blasˇkic´ Trial Chamber in this respect referred to amongst others the overall
political background; the establishment and implementation of autonomous political
structures; the general content of the political programme; media propaganda; the
establishment and implementation of autonomous military structures; the mobili-
zation of armed forces; the execution of temporally and geographically repeated and
co-ordinated military oﬀensives; and the existence of links between the military
hierarchy and the political structure and its programme (para. 204). Also see Sch-
abas, UN International Criminal Tribunals (n. 9 above) 193.
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that the Tribunal did not have to consider situations of widespread, yet
unrelated, armed violence. In this light, the ICTY could logically and
understandably award the contextual circumstances a central position
in its substantiation of the systematic character of the attack.
The ICC may, however, be presented with more varied and con-
troversial situations since the Rome Statute opens the jurisdiction of
the ICC to situations of large scale violence outside the context of an
armed conﬂict. In the situation in Kenya, for example, the contextual
circumstances were far less evident. The Pre-Trial Chamber conse-
quently focused on other factual circumstances evidencing the orga-
nized character of the attack against the civilian population.
Could the recognition of the policy as an element of crime have an
added value in these and similar cases of unorganized/loosely orga-
nized large-scale violence? The answer to this question depends on the
interpretation and application of the policy element by the ICC and
its interpretation and application of the other chapeau elements.
These are still largely undetermined. With respect to the interpreta-
tion of the policy element by the ICC, it can, however, already be
observed that the ICC appears to have seriously limited the added
value of the policy element by adopting a relatively broad under-
standing of the organizational policy concept. The majority in the
Kenya decision considered that this concept includes private organi-
zations. By doing so, the Pre-Trial Chamber diminished the exclusive
restrictive eﬀect of the policy element, that is the requirement of the
involvement of a state or a ‘‘state like’’ organization in the crimes
committed. The other chapeau elements, in particular the widespread
or systematic attack- and the civilian population-requirements, ap-
pear to require some form of organization. It is, after all, practically
diﬃcult, if not impossible, for individuals or unorganized persons to
execute an attack with these characteristics. These requirements do,
however, not necessarily limit the crimes against humanity concept to
crimes that involve a State or ‘‘State like’’ organization. Had the
majority of the ICC interpreted the organizational policy concept in a
more restricted manner, the policy element could on this point have
had a restraining eﬀect on the crimes against humanity concept. This
observation illustrates that the elements of crimes against humanity
are interconnected.82 The abstract interpretation and practical
application of one element does not merely determine its own
82 In this light also see L. J. van den Herik, Using Custom to Reconceptualize
Crimes Against Humanity’, in S. Darcy & J. Powderly (eds.), Judicial Creativity at
the International Criminal Tribunals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 80, 102.
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meaning, scope and position, but additionally inﬂuences the value
and need for other elements of crime. The value of and need for an
autonomous policy element are concordantly related to the inter-
pretation and application of the widespread or systematic attack-
requirement and the civilian population-requirement.
Furthermore, it must be observed that the position and meaning
of the policy are not exclusively determined by its abstract charac-
terization, but are additionally shaped by its application to the spe-
ciﬁc factual situation of individual cases. Despite their diﬀerent
theoretical characterization of the policy, the ICTY and the ICC
apply the policy underlying crimes against humanity in an essentially
similar manner. This practical similarity of a theoretically diﬀerent
concept may be explained by the ‘‘open-texture’’ of legal rules and the
factor-based character of legal reasoning.
V JUDICIAL REASONING
5.1 The Open-Texture of Legal Rules
Judicial institutions operate on the basis of argumentative legiti-
macy,83 or put simply, they must justify their decisions on the basis of
rational arguments. In law, there are explicit presumptions regarding
the form and substance of these arguments. The primary and most
fundamental presumption with respect to judicial argumentation in
(international criminal) law is that it is rule-based.84 For the most
part, the rules of international criminal law are laid down in statutes
and judicial decisions. These sources jointly explicate the elements of
international crimes- the individually necessary and jointly suﬃcient
conditions that give rise to criminal responsibility for international
crimes. Article 7 of the Rome Statute, for example, determines that
83 H. L. Packer, The Limits of Criminal Sanction (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1968) 88; B. Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Jus-
tice, Towards a European Jurisprudence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) 116–
117; L. Moral Soriano, The Use of Precedents as Arguments of Authority, Argu-
ments ab exemplo, and Arguments of Reason in Civil Law Systems’ (1998) 11 Ratio
Juris 90, 91–92; A. Cassese, The ICTY: A Living and Vital Reality’ (2004) 2 JICJ
585, 589; W. Twining & D. Miers, How to do Things with Rules (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010) 268–270.
84 F. R. Coudert, Certainty and Justice, Studies of the Conﬂict Between Precedent
and Progress in the Development of Law (New York: D. Appleton and Company,
1914) 1. See also G. Lamond, Do Precedents Create Rules?’ (2005) 11 Legal Theory
1, 5–6; Twining & Miers (n. 83 above) 32.
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the listed individual criminal acts may be qualiﬁed as crimes against
humanity only when the accused knew that these acts were com-
mitted as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against
any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a state or
organizational policy to commit such attack.
The elements of crime are general in character. That means that
they are context-independent and may be applied to a variety of
unknown future situations. The elements of crime are therefore
necessarily and inevitably formulated in relatively abstract terms.
They are consequently characterized by, what H.L.A. Hart calls, an
open texture’.85 In the context of concrete cases, when the particular
case has to be observed in the light of general rules of law, questions
may arise concerning the meaning and scope of the abstract elements
of crime. Does the term systematic’ in the elements of crimes against
humanity, for example, imply a preconceived plan?
Rather than settle the discussion on the meaning and scope of the
law, the elements of crime have thus stimulated an interpretative pro-
cess.86 In response to questions raised in individual cases, judges have
interpreted and explicated the elements of crime by rephrasing the
abstract terms of these elements inmore concrete deﬁnitions or criteria.
By doing so, they have provided further guidance for the assessment of
the elements of crime in a speciﬁc situation. With respect to the wide-
spread or systematic attack-requirement of the crimes against
humanity concept, the ICTY has, for example, held that the systematic
character of the attack refers to the organized nature of the violence
and the improbability of their random occurrence’.87 These judicial
interpretations are authoritative for the Tribunal. They are
consistently referred to when setting out the meaning and scope of the
law and have acquired a central position in the Tribunal’s reasoning.
85 J. M. Brennan, The Open Texture of Moral Concepts (Michigan: Macmillan,
1977); H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 12. The
open texture of rules of international criminal law has been previously signaled and
illustrated by various scholars. See J. Klabbers, The Meaning of Rules’ (2006) 20
International Relations 295, 298; H. van der Wilt, Equal Standards? On the Dia-
lectics Between National Jurisdictions and the International Criminal Court’ (2008) 8
International Criminal Law Review 229, 263–264; E. van Sliedregt, System Crimi-
nality at the ICTY-Individual Responsibility & Collective Criminality’, in A. Nol-
lkeamper & Harmen van der Wilt (eds.), System Criminality (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2009) 183, 199–200.
86 Klabbers (n. 85 above) 300.
87 See Kunurac Appeal Judgment, para 94; Blasˇkic´ Appeal Judgment, para. 101;
Kordic´ & Cˇerkez Appeal Judgment, para. 94; Martic´ Trial Judgment, para. 49.
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Like the elements of crime, the judicial interpretations can, how-
ever, not be applied in a simple, deductive manner. Because the
deﬁnitions and criteria are still formulated in general terms, their
meaning and scope are not carved in stone, but allow leeway for
diverse applications. Depending on the way in which deﬁnitions and
criteria are applied to the facts of a case, they may acquire either a
broad or a restrictive meaning. It thus follows that even the combined
analysis of the elements of crime and their judicial interpretation will
not exclude doubts regarding their applicability in individual cases.
The ICTY and ICC are clearly aware of this problem and have
responded to the need for further practical guidance. This is most
evident in the situations in which they explicitly listed a non-exhaustive
number of factual circumstances they consider relevant in light of the
elements of crime and their judicial criteria. TheBlasˇkic´Trial Chamber
in this respect, for example, held that the existence of a plan underlying
the indicted crimes may be surmised from inter alia the general his-
torical circumstances; media propaganda; the mobilization of armed
forces; and the imposition of discriminatorymeasures.88 In other cases,
the judges’ acknowledgment of the inﬂuence of the factual circum-
stances on the meaning and scope of the law is somewhat less speciﬁc.
With respect to several legal concepts, the ICTY has, for example,
declared that the applicability of a legal requirement or element of
crime may be inferred from the facts of the case.89 The relevant factual
circumstances and their relative weight must subsequently be derived
from the Tribunal’s evaluation of and decision regarding the legal
requirement or element in the individual case before the court.
5.2 The Character and Position of Factual Circumstances
The factual circumstances of a case, whether explicitly listed or im-
plicit in a court’s reasoning, play an essential role in the evaluation of
the accused’s responsibility for international crimes. As was previ-
ously illustrated, the meaning and scope of legal concepts, can only
be properly understood in the light of their application to a speciﬁc
factual context.90 In contrast to the elements of crime and the judicial
88 Blasˇkic´ Trial Judgment, para. 204.
89 The ICTY has, for example, held that the purpose of a Joint Criminal Enter-
prise does not need to be explicitly formulated, but may be inferred from the facts of
the case. See Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic´ (Appeal Judgment) Case No. IT-98-42-A (25
February 2004), para. 100.
90 Similar observations have been made by Van der Wilt and Van Sliedregt. See
Van der Wilt (n. 85 above) 265–268; Van Sliedregt (n. 85 above) 199–200.
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interpretations thereof, the relevant factual circumstances are not laid
down as necessary and suﬃcient conditions of the crime. Instead,
they are listed as open-ended illustrations of relevant facts. It thus
appears that the factual circumstances function as factors that favour
a certain outcome.91 In factor-based reasoning, the mere existence of
a factor does not determine the decision. That means, on the one
hand, that not all relevant factors have to be established in every case
and, on the other hand, that when they are established, factors do not
automatically determine a speciﬁc outcome, but merely move the
decision-maker in a certain direction. The establishment of an ele-
ment of crime and the determination of individual criminal respon-
sibility are in this view ultimately based on the balancing and
evaluation of all relevant factors and the relations between them.
When applying this theory to the establishment of a policy
underlying the crimes committed, it becomes evident that legally
relevant circumstances such as the mobilization of armed forces and
the imposition of discriminatory measures in an individual case
should not be observed as necessary conditions for the establishment
of a policy, but as factors favouring the establishment of a policy. The
un-coordinated character and the small scale of the crimes, on the
other hand, do not exclude the existence of a policy, but do not
favour the acceptance of this policy. The ultimate decision depends
on the balancing of the ﬁrst set of arguments, pleading for, and the
second set of arguments, pleading against the existence of a policy.
Preliminary research into the process of factor-based reasoning
illustrates that its ﬂexible character does not necessarily make this
form of reasoning unbounded. Factor-based reasoning is not con-
ducted in a vacuum; it is a means to justify the leap from the general
legal rule to the decision in the case at hand.92 It entails a particular
process to determine whether the factual circumstances of the case at
hand meet the legal standards laid down in the elements of crime and
the judicial interpretations thereof. In the process of factor-based
reasoning, the formulation of factors is primarily limited by the goals
pursued by the legal provision, whereas the subsequent weighing and
balancing of the applicable factors is structured and restricted by the
analogous application of factual standards laid down in precedents.
91 G. Sartor, Legal Reasoning: A Cognitive Approach (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005)
177.
92 A similar argument appears to be made by Moral Soriano. M. Soriano (n. 83
above) 97.
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Not every factual circumstance may be qualiﬁed as a factor.
Factor-based reasoning rather derives from the thought that factual
circumstances only become factors in light of the object of the legal
provision.93 Factors originate from the desire to achieve a certain
object and the belief that acting and deciding in a speciﬁc manner
promotes that object. Sartor in this respect adopts the following
reasoning scheme:
Having goal G; and believing that doing A, under pre-condition C, promotes G is a
reason for having the propensity to do action A under pre-condition C (viewing
precondition C as a factor favouring action A)94
On this basis, factor-based reasoning can be observed as a process or
technique that simpliﬁes and operationalizes the process of teleological
reasoning,95 a prominent formof reasoning in international criminal law.96
The subsequent weighing and balancing of the established factors
is an essential part of the process of factor-based reasoning. For the
outcome of the process is not determined by the mere existence of a
factor, but by the evaluation of the relative strength of the factors
favouring and those disfavouring a certain outcome.97 The essential
question in this respect is when a certain set of factors is suﬃcient for
the qualiﬁcation of a crime as an international crime or for the
establishment of the criminal responsibility of the accused. Diﬀerent
judges may answer this question in diﬀerent ways. The risk of arbi-
trary and inconsistent application of the law can, however, be limited
by means of analogous reasoning on the basis of precedents.
93 Sartor Legal Reasoning (n. 92 above) 178; G. Sartor, Reasoning with Factors’
(2005) 19 Argumentation 417, 417–418. Also see Van der Wilt (n. 85 above) 272.
94 Sartor Legal Reasoning (n. 92 above) 179.
95 Sartor Legal Reasoning (n. 92 above) 180.
96 A. Nollkaemper, The Legitimacy of International Law in the Case Law of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, in T. A. J. A. Vand-
amme & J. H. Reestman (eds.), Ambiguity in the Rule of Law: The Interface Between
National and International Legal Systems (The Hague: Europa law Publishing, 2001)
13, 18; Mia Swart, Judges and Lawmaking at the International Criminal Tribunals for
the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (Ph.D. Thesis, Leiden University, 2006) 65; J.
Powderly, Judicial Interpretation at the ad hoc Tribunals: Method from Chaos?’, in
S. Darcy & J. Powderly (eds.), Judicial Creativity at the International Criminal Tri-
bunals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 17, 40–41; D. Robinson, The Two
Liberalisms of International Criminal Law’, in C. Stahn & L. van den Herik (eds.),
Future Perspectives on International Criminal Justice (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser
Press, 2010) 115, 136–142.
97 Sartor Legal Reasoning (n. 92 above) 221.
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5.3 Precedents in Factor-Based Reasoning
The use of precedents in legal reasoning is particularly studied in
relation to the common law and its doctrine of stare decisis.98However,
it is not unique to comman law. In every legal system judges make
use of precedents when deciding cases.99 The manner in which prece-
dents are used and the weight that is attached to precedents, however,
diﬀers. In international criminal law, precedents are not recognized as
sources of law nor is the doctrine of stare decisis strictly adhered to.100
This does not mean, though, that precedents are irrelevant in judicial
decision-making.101 They are most explicitly referred to in the reiter-
ation and conﬁrmation of previously deﬁned interpretative criteria and
98 D. N. MacCormick & R. S. Summers, Introduction’, in D. N. MacCormick &
R. S. Summers (eds.), Interpreting Precedents: A Comparative Study (London:
Ashgate/Darthmouth, 1997) 1, 11–12.
99 MacCormick & Summers (n. 99 above); M. Schahabuddeen, Precedent in the
World Court (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); M. Lasser, Judicial
Deliberations: A Comparative Analysis of Judicial Transparency and Legitimacy
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
100 Kupresˇkic´ et al. Trial Judgment, para. 540; Prosecutor v. Aleksovski (Appeal
Judgment) Case No. IT-95-14/1-A (24March 2000), paras. 107–114. In the latter case,
the Appeals Chamber explicates that a proper construction of the Statute, taking due
account of its text and purpose, yields the conclusion that in the interests of certainty
and predictability, the Appeals Chamber should follow its previous decisions, but
should be free to depart from them for cogent reasons in the interests of justice.
Instances of situations where cogent reasons in the interests of justice require a
departure from a previous decision include cases where the previous decision has been
decided on the basis of a wrong legal principle or cases where a previous decision has
been given per incuriam, that is a judicial decision that has been ‘‘wrongly decided,
usually because the judge or judges were ill-informed about the applicable law.’’ It is
necessary to stress that the normal rule is that previous decisions are to be followed,
and departure from them is the exception. The Appeals Chamber will only depart
from a previous decision after the most careful consideration has been given to it,
both as to the law, including the authorities cited, and the facts’ (paras. 107–109)
(footnotes omitted). The Appeals Chamber furthermore considered that a proper
construction of the Statute requires that the ratio decidendi of its decisions is binding
on Trial Chambers (…).The Appeals Chamber considers that decisions of Trial
Chambers, which are bodies with coordinate jurisdiction, have no binding force on
each other, although a Trial Chamber is free to follow the decision of another Trial
Chamber if it ﬁnds that decision persuasive’ (paras. 113–114).
101 C. Harris, Precedent in the Practice of the ICTY’, in R. May et al. (eds.),
Essays on ICTY Procedure and Evidence in Honour of Gabrielle Kirk McDonald (The
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001) 341, 344–356; A. M. Danner, When Courts
Make Law: How the International Criminal Tribunals Recast the Laws of War’
(2006) 59 Vanderbilt Law Review 1, 49.
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deﬁnitions. Precedents are then used as sources for the applicability of
those criteria and deﬁnitions without observing the factual analogy
between the precedent and the present case.102When judicial reasoning
is observed as a process of weighing and balancing factors, precedents,
however, acquire an additional argumentative role. In this respect,
precedents are observed as past situations in which a set of factual
circumstances was weighed and decided upon.103 Assuming that new
cases should be decided in a similar manner, one can argue that the
fact that a precedent (X) had outcome (Y) in the presence of factors (Z),
justiﬁes the thought that this combination of factors (Z) produces this
outcome (Y) in future cases as well.104 A previous decisionmade on the
basis of a combination of factors may in this view be applied analog-
ically in future similar cases.Where diﬀerences between cases occur, the
judge must ask himself whether these diﬀerences justify a defeat of the
precedent in light of the underlying purpose of the legal rule.
When observing precedents in this manner, it becomes essential
that judges explicate what factors underlie their decision on the
accused’s responsibility for international crimes. They have to
characterize the factual circumstances of the case in light of the rel-
evant factors, judicial deﬁnitions and criteria and, ultimately, the
elements of crime. For only on the basis of this explication, can
judges in future cases evaluate the factual analogies between the
precedent and the present case.105
102 This use of precedents in the context of international criminal law appears to
resemble the use of precedents in civil law systems. MacCormick and Summers in
this respect observe that precedents are commonly conceived as loci of relatively
abstract rules or (perhaps even more) principles, and it is generally to the stated rule
or principle of law espoused by the court as an interpretation of code or statute that
normative force attaches for the subsequent court, even where code or statute does
not closely govern. There is usually not, as in common law systems, a restriction of
the binding element to a ruling on an issue of law considered in the special light of
the material facts of the case. Thus what we call the model of particular analogy
plays far less part here. (…) [P]recedents can be treated as applicable, and applied,
without any explicit consideration of their aptness for application in the instant case
in the light of its material facts (…).’ D. N. MacCormick & R. S. Summers, Further
General Reﬂections and Conclusions’, in D. N. MacCormick & R. S. Summers (n. 99
above) 531, 536–537 and 539.
103 Sartor Legal Reasoning (n. 92 above) 738; Lamond (n. 84 above) 15.
104 Moral Soriano (n. 83 above) 99; Sartor Legal Reasoning (n. 92 above) 738;
Lamond (n. 84 above) 15.
105 M. J. Borgers, De Communicatieve Rechter’, in Controverses Rondom Le-
galiteit en Legitimatie, Handelingen Nederlandse Juristen-Vereniging 2011-1 (The
Hague: Kluwer, 2011) 103, 130–135.
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It follows that the fact-based evaluation of the law in factor-based
reasoning does not necessarily make the meaning and scope of legal
concepts unclear, uncertain or unbounded. Factor-based reasoning
rather strikes a balance between the need for ﬂexibility and sub-
stantive justice and the need for legal certainty and the rule of law. On
the one hand, by observing the totality of relevant precedents in
relation to each other, the judge will be able to determine an ordering
of factors (which factors and combinations of factors carry suﬃcient
weight to qualify an attack as widespread or systematic?) and will
have to decide a new case on the basis of this established ordering.
One the other hand, because factors operate in a non-decisive man-
ner, factor-based reasoning is susceptible to the possibility that future
cases present new factual circumstances that shed such a diﬀerent
light on the circumstances the Tribunal previously considered suﬃ-
cient for the establishment of an element of crime, that it may not
come to the same conclusion in this future case.106 The law in this
light remains open for continuous development and improvement.
5.4 Implications for the Policy Requirement and Debate
When observing the judicial decision-making process as a process of
factor-based reasoning, it becomes understandable how and why the
inclusion of the policy as an element of crime in the Rome Statute has
not resulted in a diﬀerent understanding of the crimes against
humanity concept by the ICC in comparison to the ICTY. The
abstract formulation of the policy element in the Rome Statute allows
leeway for the recognition of a variety of relevant factors that may be
balanced in various ways, resulting in either a more restrictive or a
more liberal understanding of the element. By exploiting this leeway
when applying the policy element to a factual situation, the ICC is
able to apply the element in a manner that is very similar to the
ICTY’s application of the policy factor in the context of the sys-
tematic attack-requirement.
Furthermore, the theory of factor-based reasoning holds that the
factors are formulated in light of the object underlying the legal rule
or concept. Rules and concepts that pursue a similar object will thus
be evaluated on the basis of similar factors. Both the ICTY and the
ICC have acknowledged that the object underlying the policy element
106 K. van Willigenburg, Casuı¨stiek en de Individualiseerbaarheid van Rec-
hterlijke Beslissingen in het Materie¨le Strafrecht’ (2011) 41 Delikt en Delinkwent 365.
Van Willigenburg derives from J. Darcy, Ethics Without Principles (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004).
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and systematic attack-requirement is the exclusion of isolated crimes
committed according to an individual plan from the crimes against
humanity concept. In view of the theory of factor-based reasoning,
these requirements will thus have to be evaluated on the basis of
similar factual circumstances. Consequently, the policy can acquire a
similar meaning and scope, irrespective of its qualiﬁcation as either
an evidentiary relevant circumstance or an element of crime.
This is not to say that the inclusion of a policy element in the
Rome Statute is unnecessary or useless and will never have an eﬀect
on legal doctrine. Nor should it automatically lead to the conclusion
that the ICC has misapplied its Statute. It merely states that the
meaning, scope and position of the policy do not solely depend on its
theoretical characterization, but are additionally shaped by the
application of the requirement/factor to speciﬁc factual situations. In
light of this application, theoretically diﬀerent conceptions of the
policy may acquire an analogous meaning.
These observations do undermine the value of the theoretical
distinction between the policy as an element of crime or as an evi-
dentiary circumstance. They show that it is essential that discussions
about the value of the inclusion of a policy element in the crimes
against humanity concept are not limited to the abstract character-
ization of the law, but take additional account of its practical
application. To date, this has been insuﬃciently recognized in the
academic debate on the policy underlying crimes against humanity.
This debate has been primarily concerned with the theoretical
characterization of the policy as either an element of crime or a
relevant factual circumstance, while little or no attention has been
paid to the way in which this factor/requirement is applied in indi-
vidual cases. By focusing on the theoretical characterization of the
policy, legal scholars fail to take account of the way in which the law
is shaped in the context of its practical application. They may con-
sequently engage in a debate that is, in essence, merely theoretical. It
is therefore advisable that the current debate is supplemented with a
more practical discourse in which the jurisprudence of the ICTY and
ICC is analyzed and evaluated on the basis of their application of the
policy factor/requirement in individual cases. This discourse may
demonstrate that the inclusion of the policy as a necessary condition
of crimes against humanity does not necessarily guarantee the
exclusion of isolated, random and individually committed crimes
from the scope of crimes against humanity any more than its rec-
ognition as a relevant circumstance. Whether this is so will largely
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depend on the application of the policy element to the factual situ-
ation of individual cases.
VI CONCLUSIONS
The analysis of the ICTY’s and ICC’s case law shows that these two
institutions apply the policy underlying crimes against humanity in a
very similar manner. Their diﬀerent characterization of the policy as
either an element of crimes against humanity or an evidentiary circum-
stance does not appear to fundamentally aﬀect its position, meaning or
scope. This may be explained by the ‘‘open-textured’’ character of legal
rules. The abstract terms in which the elements of international crimes
are formulated in Statutes and case law, provide leeway for various
applications. By using the leeway of the legal elements in the course of
their application, theoretically diﬀerent concepts may acquire an anal-
ogous position, meaning and scope. The meaning and scope of legal
concepts are thus not merely determined by their theoretical character-
ization, but also by their practical application.
In this view, the focus of the current academic debate on the
theoretical characterization of the policy is deﬁcient. A comprehen-
sive study of the crimes against humanity concept requires an addi-
tional analysis of the practical application of the policy requirement.
This analysis may show that further restriction of the law is unnec-
essary or that theoretical legal reforms did not have the expected
eﬀect in legal practice.
This article is a ﬁrst step in the direction of a more practical
evaluation of the ICTY’s and ICC’s understanding and application of
legal rules and concepts. Further research into the way in which
abstract elements and requirements are applied to speciﬁc factual
situations is, however, desirable. This research should particularly
address the character of factor-based and analogous reasoning and
the inﬂuence of such reasoning on judicial decision-making in inter-
national criminal law.
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